TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting) Record Checker

Fetches a domain's _smtp._tls TXT record to diagnose whether the report destination (rua) for failed TLS connections is configured correctly per RFC 8460. Useful alongside MTA-STS/DANE.

Diagnosing reports of failed TLS connections (TLS-RPT)

Adopting MTA-STS or DANE leaves one thing out of view: **whether delivery is actually failing is known only to the sending side.** TLS-RPT is the arrangement that fills that gap. Write a reporting address into the `_smtp._tls` TXT record and **sending servers will send you a daily report.** This tool fetches that record and reports whether its form conforms to RFC 8460.

**TLS-RPT is not itself a defence but a means of observation.** It does nothing to stop an attack; it merely tells you how often establishing TLS failed. **Without that observation, however, there is no way to judge when to move MTA-STS to `enforce`.** Should delivery stop the moment enforcement begins, you would not learn of it until someone complained. **The settled order in practice is therefore to set up TLS-RPT first, run MTA-STS at `testing` while reading the reports, and move to `enforce` only once you are satisfied nothing is failing.**

How to use it

  1. Enter the domain Give the domain alone, in the form `example.com`.
  2. Check the TXT record **Look for `v=TLSRPTv1` and a `rua=`.**
  3. Confirm the form of the reporting address It is written with `mailto:` or `https:`. **Confirm too that the address can actually receive.**
  4. Settle who will read the reports **Setting it up and never reading them comes to nothing.** Decide who looks, and when.

Tips for getting more out of it

  • TLS-RPT is declared by the receiving domain but consumed by sending mail servers, which use it to know where to send statistics whenever a TLS connection to your domain fails.
  • The rua field can list a mailto: address, an https: endpoint, or both, separated by commas, so you can route reports to a mailbox and an automated collector at the same time.
  • Reports arrive as JSON (application/tlsrpt+json, often gzip-compressed), so it helps to set up a dedicated parser or mailbox rather than expecting to read them by eye.
  • Right after rolling out MTA-STS or DANE, keep an eye on TLS-RPT reports for a while to catch any misconfiguration you might have missed.
  • Major mail providers such as Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo all send TLS-RPT reports, so domains that exchange a lot of mail with them benefit the most from adopting it.

Where it comes in useful

Before moving MTA-STS to enforcement

**You can measure whether anything is failing while still at `testing`**, which gives you grounds for the decision.

Noticing delivery trouble early

You learn that failures are occurring without waiting for someone to tell you.

Monitoring after adopting DANE

**A mismatch between certificate and TLSA record shows up in the reports as a failure.**

Confirming the form of your record

A mistake in how `rua` is written shows itself as no report ever arriving.

TLS-RPT terms

_smtp._tls TXT
**The DNS record carrying the reporting address.** It is written in the form `v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:...`.
Rua
Where the reports are to go. **State an email address or an HTTPS endpoint prepared to receive them.**
RFC 8460
The standard defining the format of TLS-RPT and the contents of a report.
Daily report
The report a sending server sends covering one day. It carries the counts of successes and failures and the reasons for the failures.
MTA-STS
The arrangement enforcing TLS. **TLS-RPT is combined with it to see how that enforcement is actually working out.**
DANE
The arrangement validating certificates on the premise of DNSSEC. **Trouble here surfaces in the TLS-RPT reports as well.**

FAQ

MTA-STS is the enforcement mechanism that forces TLS on inbound mail. TLS-RPT is the observability mechanism that reports back whether TLS connections are actually failing. They're configured independently, and you can adopt either one on its own.

Not necessarily — most domains still don't use TLS-RPT. But if you've adopted MTA-STS or DANE, setting up TLS-RPT alongside them is worth doing so you can catch misconfigurations.

To whichever mailto: address or https: endpoint is listed in the TXT record's rua field. You can list multiple destinations separated by commas.

The reports are structured JSON data, so most operators rely on a monitoring tool or script for automated aggregation rather than reading them by eye. Several vendors offer dedicated report-parsing services.

This tool only checks the syntax and required fields (v, rua) of the TXT record. It doesn't verify that reports actually arrive, so after setup, wait a few days and confirm a report email actually shows up.
Tool-kun

Side Note — The "silent failure" gap that TLS-RPT closed

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting, RFC 8460) was published in 2018, almost alongside MTA-STS (RFC 8461). The two were developed in the same working group and share a lot in common — both build on a DNS TXT record, and both were jointly pushed forward by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and others — but they play very different roles. MTA-STS is the enforcement layer that forces TLS; TLS-RPT is the observability layer that reveals what actually happened once you did.

Before TLS-RPT existed, a failed TLS handshake during SMTP delivery was, in most cases, logged only on the sending server and never surfaced to the receiving domain's administrator at all. An expired certificate or a misconfigured MTA-STS policy could silently break mail delivery, and nobody would notice until mail actually stopped arriving — a real operational blind spot.

With TLS-RPT in place, a daily aggregate report is sent to whatever destination you list in rua. The report is structured JSON (application/tlsrpt+json, often gzip-compressed) containing success/failure counts and, for failures, the underlying cause (a certificate mismatch, a failed STARTTLS negotiation, and so on) — built to be ingested by monitoring tooling rather than read by a human.

In practice, TLS-RPT is usually set up together with MTA-STS or DANE. Deploying enforcement alone gives you no way to notice if a misconfiguration is silently blocking legitimate mail; watching TLS-RPT reports lets you roll out enforcement safely.